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Abstract
It is often suggested that disagreement among scientific experts is
a reason not to trust those experts, even about matters on which
they are in agreement. In direct opposition to this view, I argue
here that the very fact that there is disagreement among experts on
a given issue provides a positive reason for non-experts to trust that
the experts really are justified in their attitudes towards consensus
theories. I show how this line of thought can be spelled out in three
distinct frameworks for non-deductive reasoning, viz. Bayesian Con-
firmation Theory, Inference to the Best Explanation, and Inferential
Robustness Analysis.
1 Introduction
Since laypeople do not generally have access to relevant scientific evidence
or the skills to analyze it, they are forced to rely on the testimony of
scientific experts when evaluating scientific theories. However, one salient
fact about scientific experts is that they frequently disagree amongst them-
selves. In public discourse, this fact is often taken as a reason not to trust
experts, even on matters on which there is little or no expert disagree-
ment. For example, climate scientists currently disagree about whether we
are now experiencing a ‘pause’ in CO2-induced global warming – and, if
so, what explains that. This disagreement is frequently cited by so-called
‘climate skeptics’ as a reason to distrust climate science generally. In par-
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ticular, this disagreement is appealed to as a reason to be skeptical of the
nearly unanimously accepted theory that human influence is a significant
contributing cause of the rise in mean global temperatures from the mid-
20th century onwards.1 Indeed, even those on the other side of the climate
change debate have worried that the disagreement in question undermines
the public’s trust in climate science generally and anthropogenic climate
change in particular.2
Moreover, there are reasons to think that scientists themselves take this
sort of worry sufficiently seriously that they sometimes feel the need to
mask their disagreements in order to gain or retain the public’s trust. A
case in point is John Beatty’s (2006) historical study of the deliberations
of a panel of expert geneticists, commissioned at the height of the nuclear
age by the United States National Academy of Science to produce a re-
port on the safe ranges of exposure to atomic radiation. The official report
eventually issued, The Biological Effects of Atomic Radiation (1956), re-
ported a consensus position on key issues such as the probable amount
of mutation induced by different doses of radiation. However, the report
also withheld significant information from the public about the extent to
which these experts disagreed on a host of related issues, such as the degree
of uncertainty involved and the manner in which they thought the results
should be calculated. This information about the extent to which the panel
members disagreed appears to have been deliberately withheld for fear of
undermining the panel’s epistemic authority with regard to the key issues
they were requested to investigate.
In direct opposition to the line of thought that undergirds these re-
sponses, I shall argue that expert disagreement can provide non-experts
with a (pro tanto) reason to believe that the experts are indeed trustwor-
thy with regard to the claims on which they agree. Although my approach
abstracts away from specific scientific controversies such as those mentioned
above, it is worth noting that the argument spelled out below has impor-
1One widely read ‘climate skeptic’ blog argues that that climate scientists should not
be trusted because they “can’t even make up their minds about the temperature of the
Earth, about whether or not there was a pause in global warming, let alone about what
the climate might do next” (Worrall, 2016).
2A recent Spiegel article claimed that the controversy over a possible pause in CO2-
induced climate change “sends confusing and mixed messages to the lay public” (Traufet-
ter, 2009).
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tant implications both for the way in which laypeople should evaluate the
testimony of scientific experts, and for the manner in which such scientists
should communicate their results to epistemically rational non-experts. For
example, the current disagreement among climate scientists on the alleged
‘pause’ in CO2-induced global warming may well provide both policy mak-
ers and the public with an additional reason to trust climate scientists
regarding the issues on which they agree, including anthropogenic climate
change. Looking at the issue from the climate scientists’ point of view, the
argument of this paper suggests that climate scientists should not shy away
from acknowledging scientific disagreements when communicating with ra-
tional policy makers and reasonable members of the general public.
2 Preliminaries
Let us say that there is a consensus on a proposition P within a group
G just in case all or nearly all of the members of G have the same or a
very similar positive doxastic attitude towards P . For example, if 96%
of a group have credences above 0.9 in some proposition P , then for our
purposes the group will count as exhibiting consensus on P .3,4 Similarly,
I will say that there is disagreement within a group with regard to P if
and only if it is not the case that all or nearly all of those members of the
group that have a doxastic attitude towards P at all have the same or very
similar doxastic attitude towards P . Put differently, a group disagrees on P
just in case there is no consensus on P among those members of the group
who have doxastic attitudes towards P at all.5 It will also be convenient
to settle on some terminology: Let con(T1) be the proposition that there is
consensus among the experts on the relevant scientific topic that T1 is true;
3This definition is vague in at least two obvious ways, viz. in the phrases ‘all or
nearly all’ and ‘same or very similar’. Arguably, the definition also inherits vagueness in
appealing to what is presumably itself a vague notion of group membership. However,
since nothing in what follows will turn on the exact extension the concept, our definition
of ‘consensus’ is sufficiently precise for current purposes.
4It is worth noting that, by this definition, a group G does not count as being in a
consensus on P if there is a significant subset of G that is indifferent about P .
5As Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013, 11n) point out, it would be unnatural to say
that S1 and S2 disagree on P if S1 believes P and S2 is agnostic about P . Similarly, it
would be unnatural to say that a group disagrees about P if the only members of the
group who do not have a specific doxastic attitude towards P have no such attitude at
all, even if this is true of a quite significant proportion of the group’s members.
3
let dis(T2, ..., Tn) be the proposition that experts disagree about T2-Tn; and
let jus(T1) be the proposition that T1 really is epistemically justified by the
scientific evidence available to the experts.
My concern in what follows is with what a non-expert on a given topic,
i.e. a layperson or novice, should infer from a combination of consensus and
disagreement in a group of people that are perceived to be experts on that
topic. I do not have any specific account of expertise in mind here; rather,
what I say should be consistent with any plausible account of expertise
(e.g. Goldman, 2001). However, two points are worth emphasizing in this
regard: First, a non-expert will be assumed not to have access to, or the
requisite skills to evaluate, the evidence or arguments on the basis of which
the perceived experts form their opinions. Second, the group to which the
non-experts are appealing will be assumed to consist of perceived experts
– what Scholz (2009, 187) calls “experts in a subjective sense” as opposed
to “experts in an objective sense”. Thus it will be left open whether the
members of the group in question really are experts (or deserve to be called
by that name), and instead merely assumed that they are thought of as
such by non-experts.
As my examples so far indicate, the focus of this paper will be on cases
in which the consensus theory T1 and the contested (i.e. disagreed-upon)
theories T2-Tn fall within the same domain of expertise. Indeed, for reasons
that will become clearer below, my argument will not apply to cases in
which the consensus theory T1 and the contested theories T2-Tn concern
entirely different issues, roughly since that defeats any reason to think that
experts who disagree on T2-Tn would not agree on T1 unless it really is
justified.6 Furthermore, I will only be concerned here with consensus and
disagreement about factual issues for which it is possible to obtain epistemic
justification, i.e. issues in which there is an in-principle discoverable fact
of the matter as to whether the theories in question are true or false. So
for example, if no moral claims are true and/or epistemically justified (as
per some forms of moral anti-realism), then my argument below would not
apply to consensus and disagreements about morality. Perhaps similarly,
it has been argued that at least some mathematical hypotheses, such as
6Thus, for example, my argument does not imply that the fact that theoretical physi-
cists widely disagree on philosophical or methodological issues – such as the existence of
God, or whether Bayesianism provides the basis for a correct account of scientific rea-
soning – gives us any reason to think that consensus theories in physics are justified.
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George Cantor’s Continuum Hypothesis, are absolutely undecidable and
perhaps even indeterminate (Clarke-Doane, 2013, 2014). If this kind of
anti-realism about (some) mathematical hypotheses is correct, then my
argument does not apply to those particular mathematical claims either.7
The discussion in the following sections aims to establish a relation of
epistemic support between the fact that a group of experts disagrees on
some theories and the claim that a consensus theory is epistemically justi-
fied by the evidence available to those experts. Note that this connection
is not directly concerned with the truth of the theory on which there is ex-
pert consensus; rather, it it is concerned with the claim that the consensus
theory is epistemically justified by the available evidence. The former is
a first-order claim about some proposition P , while the latter is a second-
order claim that some evidence E makes P epistemically justified. Of
course, the two claims are closely related since it is at least plausible that
the fact that a group of experts are epistemically justified in believing some
claim is itself a reason to believe that the claim is true. However, it turns
out to be surprisingly difficult to say exactly how evidence for second-order
claims of this sort should affect our attitudes towards the corresponding
first-order claims (see ?Fitelson, 2012; Feldman, 2014; Roche, 2014; Come-
saña and Tal, 2015; Tal and Comesaña, 2015). To bracket this issue, I will
not be assuming any specific epistemic connection between the first- and
second-order claims.
In saying that disagreement among experts is a reason to believe that
consensus theories are epistemically justified, I do not mean to deny that
there may be other – possibly stronger – reasons to believe that such con-
sensus theories are not justified. Put differently, I aim to establish that
disagreement can be a pro tanto reason to believe that a consensus theory
is justified, where a pro tanto reason for something is a reason that might
be outweighed by other reasons against it. Furthermore, I want to acknowl-
edge that this reason to believe that consensus theories are epistemically
justified is defeasible in the sense that such a reason may be nullified or
7On the other hand, if and to the extent that mathematical hypotheses are decidable
and determinate, my argument applies to mathematical claims as well as the kind of
empirical claims I have used as examples so far. More generally, there is nothing in
particular about the argument below that restricts its scope to empirical claims, except
in so far as one takes an anti-realist attitude towards various sorts of non-empirical
claims (e.g. moral or mathematical claims).
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cancelled by the addition of new information. Thus, to be perfectly precise,
what I will argue below is that in the absence of such further information,
the fact that a group of scientific experts disagree on some theories is a
pro tanto reason to believe that a theory on which they have reached a
consensus is indeed epistemically justified.
A final note: In the next three sections, I shall be giving three versions of
what I consider to be essentially the same argument. Each version appeals
to a distinct epistemological framework for non-deductive reasoning, viz.
(i) a ‘Bayesian’ framework that appeals to Bayesian Confirmation Theory,
(ii) an ‘Explanationist’ framework that appeals to Inference to the Best
Explanation, (ii) and a ‘Robustness’ framework that appeals to Inferential
Robustness Analysis. Each framework has its advantages and limitations.
For example, Bayesian Confirmation Theory is notoriously silent on how
one should assign initial or ‘prior’ probabilities, while Inferential Robust-
ness Analysis employs a rather vague notion of presuppositional diversity.
This is not the place to choose between, or improve upon, these episte-
mological frameworks. Instead, I will work around each framework’s lim-
itations whenever possible and acknowledge where we have reached each
framework’s limits. However, the particular shortcomings of each of the
three approaches is mitigated by the fact that essentially the same argu-
ment can be spelled out in all three frameworks; hence the argument’s
soundness is not held hostage to the feasibility of any single framework for
non-deductive reasoning.
3 The Bayesian Approach
For our purposes, Bayesian Confirmation Theory (BCT) can be viewed
as the conjunction of three claims. First, rational agents have, or can be
represented as having, fine-grained beliefs known as credences. Second,
for perfectly rational agents, these credences satisfy the Kolmogorov ax-
ioms of probability, which means that their credences at a given time in
propositions can be represented as probabilities. Third, perfectly rational
agents are required to to update their credences in light of new evidence in
accordance with Bayesian Conditionalization, which holds that whenever
you obtain some evidence E (and no other evidence), you should set your
credence in H equal to the credence in H conditional on E that you had
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before you gained evidence E. Formally:
P ′(H) = P (H|E) (1)
where P ′(·) the probability function you should adopt after obtaining E and
P (·) is the probability distribution you had before. It follows immediately
that obtaining E increases the credence a rational agent assigns to H just
in case
P (H|E) > P (H) (2)
According to Bayesians, this increase of rational credence in H by virtue of
obtaining E explicates epistemic notions such as ‘confirmation’ and ‘sup-
port’. That is, Bayesians hold that E confirms or supports H, relative to
a probability distribution P (·), just in case (2) holds.
Notice that Bayesian Confirmation Theory (henceforth BCT) relativizes
confirmation or support to a given probability function P (·). Now, some
probability functions will license what we would intuitively think of as out-
rageous assignments of probabilities; relative to such probability functions,
we will arrive at equally outrageous verdicts about whether some piece of
evidence supports some theory. This brings us to a notorious limitation
of BCT, which is that it is unclear how to distinguish acceptable from un-
acceptable probability functions.8 Nothing in what I say below solves or
ameliorates this problem; accordingly, I will not assume that probability
functions must meet any general constraints. What I will do is identify
a particular (seemingly reasonable) condition on probability functions for
which the central claim of this paper – that expert disagreement supports
consensus theories – is validated by BCT. The argument given in this sec-
tion is thus a conditional one that if one’s probability function satisfies
a particular (seemingly reasonable) condition, then expert disagreement
supports consensus theories by Bayesian lights.
Now, it is worth noting that our concern is not with whether a consensus
among scientific experts about T1, i.e. con(T1), by itself confirms that T1 is
justified. That is, our concern is not with whether the following inequality
8Indeed, for this reason, many Bayesians hold that BCT is merely a bare-bones frame-
work for non-deductive reasoning that will need to be supplemented with substantive
assumptions about acceptable probability functions (see, e.g., Howson, 2000; Strevens,
2004).
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holds:
P
(
jus(T1)|con(T1)
)
> P
(
jus(T1)
)
(3)
Rather, we will be concerned with whether disagreement about T2-Tn boosts
or increases the confirmation conferred on jus(T1) by con(T1). This corre-
sponds to the claim that jus(T1) is confirmed to a greater extent by con(T1)
and dis(T2, ..., Tn) together than by con(T1) alone. Formally:
P
(
jus(T1)|con(T1) ∧ dis(T2, ..., Tn)
)
> P
(
jus(T1)|con(T1)
)
(4)
It turns out to be easily provable that (4) holds just in case experts are
more likely to disagree on T2-Tn if they all agree that a justified theory is
true than if they all agree that an unjustified theory is true.9 Formally, (4)
holds just in case:
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ jus(T1)
)
> P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ ¬jus(T1)
) (5)
In sum, then, we have that dis(T2, ..., Tn) boosts the confirmation of jus(T1)
provided by con(T1) relative to any probability function P (·) that satisfies
the condition that the probability of disagreement among experts on T2-Tn
is greater given that a consensus theory T1 is is justified than it is given
that the consensus theory is not justified.
What does this tell us about whether scientific disagreement provides
9Proof: Using a version of Bayes’s Theorem, we write (4) as:
P
(
jus(T1)|con(T1)
)
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ jus(T1)
)
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1)
) > P (jus(T1)|con(T1))
Rearranging, we get:
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ jus(T1)
)
> P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1)
)
By the Law of Total Probability, the right-hand can be rewritten as follows:
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1)
)
= P
(
jus(T1)|con(T1)
)
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ jus(T1)
)
+ P
(¬jus(T1)|con(T1))P (dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ ¬jus(T1))
Substituting and then rearranging, we get:(
1− P (jus(T1)|con(T1)))P (dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ jus(T1))
> P
(¬jus(T1)|con(T1))P (dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1) ∧ ¬jus(T1))
Since P
(¬jus(T1)|con(T1)) = 1− P (jus(T1)|con(T1)), this is equivalent to (5).
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us with an epistemic reason to trust scientists on related topics on which
agree? On the one hand, one might feel that this purely formal result
tells us very little, since there is nothing probabilistically incoherent about
one’s probability function violating (5). As we noted above, BCT is limited
in that it is restricted to providing us with purely formal requirements
upon rational credences. All we can say on this approach is that if a
given probability function satisfies (5), then it follows that the disagreement
over T1 boosts the confirmation of jus(T1) provided by the corresponding
consensus on T1. Since BCT by itself does not forbid any probability
assignment, this result is as much as we would have reasonably hoped to
achieve within the Bayesian framework.
On the other hand, we can of course ask ourselves whether condition
(5) is satisfied for the probability functions we would normally consider
reasonable (just as we can ask ourselves whether it would be reasonable
for someone’s full beliefs to satisfy conditions that go beyond logical con-
sistency). The following consideration suggests that the answer is positive:
Presumably, it is more common for groups of scientific experts who have
reached a consensus that an unjustified theory is true to also agree on
other theories in their field irrespective of whether those theories are justi-
fied. After all, groups that agree on unjustified theories would presumably
have a lower epistemic bar for reaching such a consensus as compared with
groups that reach consensus on justified theories; and as a result of hav-
ing a lower epistemic bar for reaching consensus, the former groups would
more often have reached consensus on other theories as well, irrespective of
whether these theories are justified. Differently put, scientific experts who
have reached a consensus on an unjustified theory will less often disagree
on other theories whose epistemic status is in question, since the fact that
they reached a consensus on the unjustified theory suggests that they reach
consensus relatively easily.10
This does suggest that a reasonable probability distribution – one that
fits with reasonable background assumptions about the relative frequencies
10One could mention other reasons why experts who have reached a consensus on an
unjustified theory will less often disagree on other theories. In particular, one could
follow John Stuart Mill (1859) in arguing that disagreements are in general conducive
to a more critical atmosphere within groups, which in turn makes unjustified theories
less likely to be accepted and thus agreed upon in such groups (see also Foley, 2001;
Moffett, 2007).
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of expert disagreement in different circumstances – assigns a higher value to
P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1)∧jus(T1)
)
than P
(
dis(T2, ..., Tn)|con(T1)∧¬jus(T1)
)
,
thus satisfying (5). Relative to such a probability distribution, it follows
from the equivalence of (4) and (5) that disagreement over T2-Tn boosts the
confirmation of jus(T1) provided by the corresponding consensus on T1. Of
course, since there is nothing probabilistically incoherent about violating
(5), not all probability distributions will count as reasonable by this crite-
rion. Nevertheless, even the admittedly impoverished Bayesian framework
has delivered a result that is at least somewhat informative since the fact
that reasonable probability distributions satisfy (5) has been shown to im-
ply that expert disagreement on T2-Tn boosts the confirmation of jus(T1)
provided by con(T1) relative to probability distributions of this kind.
4 The Explanationist Approach
The Explanationist approach to non-deductive reasoning is built on the
rule of ampliative inference that Gilbert Harman (1965) famously called
Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). Roughly, IBE holds that one may
infer H from E if H provides a better potential explanation of E than
any rival explanatory theory. An explanation is said to be better than
another to the extent that it does better on various explanatory considera-
tions. Unfortunately, it is a contested issue what kind of factors should be
construed as explanatory considerations, and one that I will avoid as far as
possible in this paper. However, two factors appear universally accepted
as explanatory considerations by proponents of IBE:
Simplicity : All other things being equal, T1 is a better explanation
than T2 if T1 posits fewer entities and processes (or fewer kinds of
entities and processes) than T2.
Explanatory power : All other things being equal, T1 is a better ex-
planation than T2 if T1 explains more facts (or more kind of facts)
than T2.
In order for my argument below to have the widest possible appeal among
those who adhere to the Explanationist approach, I will only appeal to
these two considerations in what follows.
Two important but sometimes overlooked points about IBE will need
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to be kept in mind in what follows. First, any remotely plausible version
of IBE assumes a Requirement of Total Evidence to the effect that the
evidence E from which one is inferring should include all of the agent’s
relevant evidence. One would clearly not be warranted in inferring a theory
that provides a suboptimal explanation of one’s total evidence even if it
provides the best explanation of a proper part of that evidence. Second,
many inferences that are commonly characterized as instances of IBE are
indirect as opposed to direct. Whilst a direct IBE infers H from the fact
that it best explains E, an indirect IBE infers H from the fact that it
follows from some H ′ that best explains E. Incidentally, this feature of
IBE was exploited in Gilbert Harman’s (1965) seminal paper, in which he
argued that enumerative inductions can be construed as instances of IBEs
since the propositions of the form ‘The next observed A will be B’ follow
from propositions such as ‘All observed As are Bs’, which in turn provide
the explanation for evidential propositions of the form ‘All observed As are
Bs’ (Harman, 1965, 91).
Now, recall that we are concerned with whether the fact that there
is disagreement about T2-Tn among a group of scientific experts provides
a reason to believe that another theory on which there is consensus is
epistemically justified by the experts’ evidence. To answer this question
using IBE, let us compare the epistemic situation of a non-expert who
lacks the information about the scientific disagreement on T2-Tn with a
non-expert who has that information. Consider first the non-expert who is
trying to evaluate whether she should infer that H is justified from just the
fact that there is expert consensus on T1. Since the only relevant evidence
of such an agent is con(T1), she should infer jus(T1) by IBE just in case
con(T1) is best explained by a theory that entails jus(T1).
However, it is not at all clear that, in the absence of any other relevant
evidence, a consensus on some theory T1 is best explained by such a theory.
Consider the following two explanations11 for con(T1):
Critical Evaluation: Scientific experts form beliefs by examining
the scientific evidence for a given theory critically and/or indepen-
dently of each other; accordingly, they reached a consensus on T1
11Here and in what follows, I am using the term ‘explanation’ as synonymous with
‘potential explanation’ rather than ‘correct explanation’.
11
because T1 was overwhelmingly justified in light of that evidence.
Crowd Psychology: Scientific experts form beliefs irrespective of
the evidence by following the lead of their peers and/or the lead of
some scientific authority; accordingly, they reached a consensus on
T1 because T1 was believed by the relevant peers and/or authority.
The first of these explanations – Critical Evaluation – does entail
jus(T1), while the second – Crowd Psychology – does not. The prob-
lem, however, is that it is hard to see how a dispute between proponents
of each explanation could be settled if nothing but con(T1) is taken as rel-
evant evidence. After all, each explanation accounts for the evidence at
hand quite well, and neither explanation is clearly simpler than the other,
so it would seem that the two explanations are on a par with regard to
simplicity and explanatory power.12
It is worth noting that the dispute between proponents of explanations
like Critical Evaluation and Crowd Psychology is not merely hy-
pothetical. Anyone who is familiar with the debates sparked by Thomas
Kuhn (1996) about the role of sociological influences on scientific research
will know that explanations of the latter kind are frequently offered within
sociological studies of science, most famously by Latour andWoolgar (1979)
and various advocates of the ‘strong programme’ such as Barnes (1974) and
Bloor (1991). While these views are often dismissed as being committed to
an implausible form of relativism, the point here is that if we have noth-
ing but con(T1) to go on when evaluating whether T1 is justified, then it
is hard to see on what grounds the explanation they favor, Crowd Psy-
chology should be deemed worse than Critical Evaluation. After all,
the agreement on T1 by itself tells us nothing about how such an agreement
was reached.
However, the situation changes if we add to the total evidence the fact
that there is disagreement on other theories T2-Tn. To see why, note that
Critical Evaluation can easily explain dis(T2, ..., Tn) as due to the sci-
entific evidence for T2-Tn not being sufficiently univocal for scientists to
reach identical conclusions concerning these theories. Crowd Psychol-
12Of course, Critical Evaluation and Crowd Psychology (and its ilk) are not
the only possible explanations for a consensus on T1. However, I take it that these two
explanations are by some distance the most plausible explanations available for such a
consensus.
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ogy, by contrast, is unable to explain why scientists would not also follow
each other’s leads (or that of an authority) on T2-Tn as they are alleged to
have done regarding T1. Crowd Psychology, unlike Critical Eval-
uation, cannot invoke anything about the evidence for or against T2-Tn
since, according to the former explanation, such evidence has nothing to do
with whether scientists reach consensus. In short, Crowd Psychology
suffers in explanatory power compared to Critical Evaluation since
the former fails to explain something that can easily be explained by the
latter.
Of course, we can imagine a modification of Crowd Psychology that
invokes some special reasons why T2-Tn are such that the experts have failed
to reach a consensus, presumably in terms of some peculiar sociological facts
about the theories in question. The problem with this explanation (call it
Crowd Psychology+) is that it suffers in simplicity. After all, this
explanation will invoke some sociological particulars that have allegedly
prevented the scientists in question from reaching a consensus on T2-Tn
as they did on T1. Hence Crowd Psychology+ will inevitably be less
simple than its predecessor (no matter what particular reasons it invokes
to explain dis(T2, ..., Tn), and thus also less simple than Critical Eval-
uation. In sum, then, Crowd Psychology+ would make up for the
predecessor’s disadvantage with regard to explanatory power by sacrificing
its previous parity with regard to simplicity.
The upshot is that while Critical Evaluation and Crowd Psy-
chology are on a par both with regard to simplicity and explanatory
power as explanations of con(T1) alone, the situation changes once we add
dis(T2, ..., Tn) to the total evidence. At that point, Critical Evaluation
emerges as a better explanation, since its most plausible competitor either
suffers in simplicity (if it invokes special reasons to explain why there is
no consensus on T2-Tn) or explanatory power (if it does not). This helps
make jus(T1) warranted by IBE in virtue of favoring an explanation from
which jus(T1) follows – viz. Critical Evaluation – over a set of ex-
planations from which it does not – viz. Crowd Psychology and its
ilk. Thus, given the Explanationist approach to non-deductive reasoning,
disagreement on T2-Tn does indeed provide a defeasible, pro tanto reason
to believe that a related consensus theory T1 is justified.
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5 The Robustness Approach
We turn finally to spelling out the argument by appealing to the scientific
methodology known as robustness analysis, introduced by biologist Richard
Levins (1966), and developed by William Wimsatt (1981), Michael Weis-
berg (2006) and others. The basic idea behind robustness analysis is to
identify as real or true any result that holds under a variety of different
assumptions about a given phenomenon. However, as many authors have
pointed out, there are a variety of distinct methodologies discussed under
this heading in both science and philosophy (Wimsatt, 1981, 2011; Orzack
and Sober, 1993; Woodward, 2006; Calcott, 2011). Here we will be con-
cerned with a type of robustness analysis that exploits what Woodward
(2006) refers to as inferential robustness, viz. the stability of support for a
given conclusion from some set of data under a variety of different assump-
tions. I will refer to this as Inferential Robustness Analysis (IRA).
Roughly following Woodward (2006, 219-220), this notion can be pre-
cisified as follows. Suppose we have a set of data D from which we hope to
infer a conclusion C. Suppose also that D does not itself imply C, so that
some additional assumption(s) are required for C to be inferred from D.
Furthermore, suppose that a number of distinct possible assumptions A1-
Am are available, but that our background knowledge does not provide us
with any reliable means of evaluating which of these is correct.13 If for all
or most of these assumptions A1-Am, D and Ai together imply C, then C
is said to be inferentially robust with respect to A1-Am given D. The idea
behind the current type of robustness analysis is then that C’s inferential
robustness provides a strong reason for believing that C is true (given D)
for a suitable set of assumptions A1-Am.
What counts as a suitable set of assumptions A1-Am? In an ideal case,
we would know for certain that at least one of A1-Am is correct – a property
that Woodward (2006, 221) refers to as “completeness”. In such an ideal
situation, it follows logically (and thus with certainty) that C is true if D
is true. However, since this ideal case will rarely if ever materialize in any
13For simplicity’s sake, each Ai will be taken to be a single proposition as opposed to a
set of propositions. This involves no loss of generality since sets of multiple assumptions
can be converted into a single proposition by taking their conjunction.
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remotely realistic situations,14 some weaker condition must be identified
if IRA is to be applicable in such situations. To a first approximation,
the weaker condition is that the assumptions A1-Am should be sufficiently
diverse to reflect a spread of plausible possibilities and thus prevent the
inference from depending on the specifics of those assumptions. To be
more precise, since this kind of diversity is a matter of degree, we should
say that the strength of an IRA depends on the degree of diversity present
in the different assumptions A1-Am under which C is inferentially robust
given D. Thus, as many authors have noted, the basic thought behind
robustness analysis, including IRA, is that a result may be confirmed in
virtue of its being robust under a sufficiently diverse set of assumptions
about the phenomenon in question.15
We now apply this framework to the issue of what expert disagreement
reveals about scientists’ justification for consensus theories. Let us again
compare a situation in which non-experts are aware of expert disagreement
on theories related to the consensus theory and an otherwise identical sit-
uation in which they are not. Consider first the situation in which the
non-experts are not aware of the the expert disagreement on other theo-
ries. The data, D, from which we are inferring in situations of this kind
consists in the fact that there is consensus on T1 among the relevant group
of experts, con(T1), i.e. that all or nearly all of the experts agree that
T1 is true. The desired conclusion C is the proposition jus(T1), i.e. that
T1 really is epistemically justified by the evidence available to the relevant
scientists. Finally, we let each assumption Ai represent the possibility that
a given expert Ei evaluated the evidence for T1 correctly so as to have an
opinion on T1 that really is justified by the available evidence. Given this
setup, note that the desired conclusion, viz. jus(T1), does follow from all
or nearly all conjunctions of D and Ai (1 ≤ i ≤ m), as required by IRA.
However, in this situation, there is nothing to indicate that the assumptions
A1-Am exhibit the kind of presuppositional diversity required for IRA to
14Indeed, completeness only seems satisfied when either (i) the assumptions A1-Am
exhaust logical space, or (ii) some Ai is already known with certainty to be true. Neither
situation seems to arise in scientific practice or everyday life.
15See in particular Wimsatt (1981), Weisberg (2006), and Schupbach (2016). Much
more could be said about what sort of presuppositional diversity should be involved
here and how exactly it correlates with the strength of an IRA. However, that task lies
far beyond the of this paper (although see Schupbach (2016) for a detailed discussion of
precisely this issue).
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be applicable. After all, the relevant experts E1-Em may, for all we know,
have reached their conclusion on T1 by a similar or even identical process.
By contrast, consider an otherwise identical situation in which the in-
formation available to the non-experts include the fact that these experts
disagree on T2-Tn. This disagreement on theories related to T1 strongly
indicates that the experts in question have a variety of ways of evaluating
evidence in their area of expertise, e.g. that they have different background
assumptions and/or different standards for what counts as good evidence.
So, in this latter type of situation, there is at least some relevant kind of
diversity among the assumptions A1-Am. At the same time, the fact that
these all or nearly all of these experts nevertheless agree on T1 entails, for
all or most assumptions A1-Am, that T1 is epistemically justified. Thus IRA
delivers the verdict that the additional information that experts disagree
on T2-Tn, dis(T2, ..., Tn), does indeed provide a reason to believe that T1 is
justified, jus(T1), given that these same experts have reached a consensus
on T1, con(T1).
Of course, how much support jus(T1) obtains in this way will depend on
how diverse the assumptions really are – i.e. on how much diversity in the
epistemic evaluations can be assumed to be in place among experts who
disagree on other theories. However, the relevant point for our purposes is
whether the expert disagreement on other theories provides any reason at
all for non-experts to believe that T1 is justified.16 To see clearly that IRA
gives an affirmative answer to this question, it is enough to highlight the
contrast between the two situations described above with regard to presup-
positional diversity. In the first situation, we have no reason at all to think
that the experts used different or indeed non-identical methods for evaluat-
ing T1 in light of the available evidence, and so we have no reason at all to
think there is any diversity at all among the different assumptions A1-An.
In the second situation, by contrast, the fact that the experts evaluated
T2-Tn differently provides at least some reason to think the experts used
different methods to evaluate T1, which thus amounts to a boost in pre-
suppositional diversity as compared to the previous situation. This shows
unambiguously that expert disagreement helps support an inference from
consensus to justification by IRA.
16Recall also, from section 2, that my thesis is only that such a disagreement would
provide a pro tanto and defeasible reason to trust that the consensus theory is justified.
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6 The Disagreement-to-Irrationality
Objection
So far I have appealed to three distinct frameworks for non-deductive rea-
soning, arguing that in each framework expert disagreement provides non-
experts with a (pro tanto and defeasible) reason to believe that the experts
are justified in believing the theories on which they have reached a consen-
sus. As noted in the introduction, this argument goes against a common
response to expert disagreement according to which such disagreement un-
dermines the trustworthiness of experts even with respect to consensus
theories. In this section, I consider a possible argument for this response –
what I call the Disagreement-to-Irrationality Objection. Although I contend
that this argument is almost wholly without merit, I hope that discussing it
sheds some light on why a position contrary to the one taken in this paper
has seemed plausible to many authors, including a number of scientists and
scientifically-interested laypeople (see section 1).
An informal statement of the the Disagreement-to-Irrationality Objec-
tion goes as follows:
Since perfectly rational agents would reach the same or very
similar conclusions on the basis of the same evidence, disagree-
ment among experts on theories within their domain of exper-
tise indicates that the experts formed the relevant beliefs at
least somewhat irrationally. To the extent that this is so, we
should not expect the beliefs formed by such experts to be epis-
temically justified by the available evidence, including the be-
liefs on which they are in agreement. Thus, disagreement among
experts is a (pro tanto) reason to distrust those experts gen-
erally, including their judgment concerning theories on which
there is consensus.17
17Note that I am construing the Disagreement-to-Irrationality Objection as purporting
to provide a pro tanto reason to not to trust experts regarding consensus theories. One
might think that this makes the objection compatible with the position argued for in
this paper, since one could simultaneously have a pro tanto reason to φ and a pro tanto
reason to ¬φ. Unfortunately, however, this response will not work since in this case it
would be the very same thing that would constitute a reason for an against trusting
experts regarding consensus theories, viz. the fact that the same experts disagree on
other theories.
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This argument has some intuitive pull at first blush; however, I contend
that its allure disappears when it is subjected to careful scrutiny. Let’s first
formalize the argument by putting it in standard logical form:
P1. That a group of experts disagree on T2-Tn is a (pro tanto) reason to
believe that they are epistemically irrational.
P2. That the agents in a group are epistemically irrational is a (pro tanto)
reason to believe that theories on which the agents have reached a
consensus, such as T1, are not epistemically justified.
C. That a group of experts disagree on T2-Tn is a (pro tanto) reason to
believe that theories on which the agents have reached a consensus,
such as T1, are not epistemically justified. [From P1 and P2.]
My main criticism of this argument is that its appeal is due to an equivo-
cation. Once this equivocation is resolved, it will become clear that there
is no sound argument to be made here.
Before we get to my main criticism, let us note that P1 is only plausible
in so far as it is credible that experts could not come to have conflicting
doxastic attitudes towards the same propositions without some of them
being epistemically irrational. This can be challenged in at least three
ways: First of all, it should be uncontroversial that an otherwise rational
agent may occasionally make mistakes, or performance errors, in her belief-
forming process. Just as an excellent archer sometimes makes a poor shot,
a highly rational agent sometimes forms doxastic attitudes that fail to
be fully justified by her evidence. At most, then, P1 holds true in cases
where the disagreement cannot plausibly be explained without positing a
systematic defect in the agents’ evaluations of the the relevant theories,
e.g. in situations in which there is very widespread disagreement among
the relevant experts. This restricts the scope of the objection.
Second, note that the experts in question could be forming their beliefs
on the basis of different evidence, in which case the fact that they reach
different conclusions from this evidence is precisely what one should ex-
pect from epistemically rational agents. Indeed, many – perhaps most –
cases of expert disagreement are cases in which the experts have formed
their beliefs on the basis of different sets of evidence. For example, expert
disagreement about climate change is often between climate scientists who
appeal to different kinds of climate models, or even between scientists from
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different branches of climate science, e.g. historical climatology and paleo-
climatology respectively. Clearly, disagreement of this kind does not in any
way indicate that either party is epistemically irrational. At most, then,
the conclusion of the argument would hold true in the limited class of cases
in which the experts in question form their doxastic attitudes based on the
same evidence.
A third and related point is that the experts may possess different back-
ground beliefs, e.g. about the reliability of different kinds of evidence and
about the relative weight one should put on different kinds of theoreti-
cal considerations. Such background beliefs will influence their reasoning
about the theories in question in a perfectly rational manner, so that ex-
perts with different background beliefs will rationally come to different,
but equally rational, conclusions in light of the same evidence. This shows
that the scope of the argument must be restricted even further to those
types of disagreements in which the parties have the same or very similar
background beliefs.
Let me now turn to my main criticism. Suppose two or more parties dis-
agree on some issues – and suppose, for the sake of the argument, that all
the evidence is shared between the parties, that they have the same back-
ground beliefs, and that the disagreement is widespread. This clearly does
not entail or even indicate that all of the disagreeing parties are epistem-
ically irrational. At most, widespread disagreement indicates that some
(perhaps even most, but certainly not all) of the disagreeing parties are
epistemically irrational. Thus P1 must be precisified as follows:
P1′. That a group of experts disagree on T2-Tn is a (pro tanto) reason to
believe that some (but not all) of them are epistemically irrational.
The relevant question, then, is whether there is an argument from P1′ to
the conclusion C.
Such an argument would have to employ the following as the second
premise in place of P2:
P2′. That some (but not all) of the agents in a group are epistemically
irrational is a (pro tanto) reason to believe that theories on which the
agents have reached a consensus, such as T1, are not epistemically
justified.
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However, this replacement for P2 is not plausible. To see why, note that it
explicitly allows that some experts in the relevant group are epistemically
rational. Accordingly, the premise provides no reason at all for believing
that there are no experts who formed their opinion on T1 and other consen-
sus theories in an epistemically rational manner. However, barring massive
performance-errors, any such subgroup of rational experts will have come
to a positive conclusion about T1 only if T1 is indeed well-supported by
available evidence. Since this subgroup constitutes part of the larger group
which has reached a consensus on T1, we would still have good reasons
to believe that T1 is epistemically justified by the available evidence. In
sum, then, the fact that some but not all of the agents in some group are
epistemically irrational will in general tell us very little, if indeed anything,
about whether the theories on which they have reached a consensus are
epistemically justified.
7 Conclusion
I have argued that non-experts can probe whether or not a theory that
enjoys consensus among a group of experts is epistemically justified by
considering whether the same group of experts disagree on other theories
within their domain of expertise. Contrary to an assumption that is fre-
quently made by scientists and laypeople alike, such disagreement should
not undermine our trust in the consensus theory. On the contrary, dis-
agreement of this kind provides us with a positive (although pro tanto and
defeasible) reason to believe that the consensus theory is indeed epistem-
ically justified. As noted in the introduction, one upshot of this is that
disagreement is not necessarily something that scientists should strive to
mask or conceal. In so far as scientists are communicating with rational
agents who are acting in good faith, the best strategy for arguing that a
consensus theory should be trusted may involve openly acknowledging that
the same experts who reached the consensus disagree on a number of other
theories within their domain of expertise.
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